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WATER RIGHTS AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
by Eric T. Freyfogle*
Our session this afternoon is billed as a debate about water rights, which is to say 
about private property rights in water flows. This phrasing of the issue suggests, but I think 
does not quite pinpoint, the matter that is now so disputed within the water-law community.
Observers these days mostly agree that changes are needed in the ways water is used. 
Too often the withdrawal of water from rivers and aquifers causes ecological damage. The 
use of water on the land causes further problems, to the land itself and to returning water 
flows. Storing water in a river, and other disruptions of natural flows, cause a third set of 
ecological harms. Although there is much for us still to learn about these problems, the 
needed inquiry would address details and technical matters, not fundamental principles.
The disputed issue today is about, not the desirability of changing water uses, but how 
these changes ought to come about. The water-rights solution relies on two methods of 
stimulating changes-market transfers of water rights, and government purchases. The 
reasoning behind this position goes something like this:
1. One of the main virtues of the market is its ability to guide valuable things to their 
highest and best uses. As alternate resource uses fluctuate in value over time, the market 
provides a low-cost, quick-acting way of bringing about transfers. When the market works 
well, resources end up shifting to higher valued uses, and the lowest valued uses come to an 
end.
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2. People today value certain uses more than they used to, particularly instream flow 
uses for fishing, recreation, ecological integrity, aesthetics, and the like. If that’s what they 
want, the market can deliver: They simply purchase the water they need from low-valued 
uses, and the change then occurs.
3. Some new needs for water are so peculiarly public that no private group is likely 
to step forward and buy the water needed to meet the needs. In such instances, tax money 
should be used to bring about the transfers, either through purchase on the open market or 
through condemnation.
4. Finally and vitally, all of this can occur without tampering with currently vested 
private water rights.
There’s a lot to be said for this line of thinking. But there’s a lot to be said against 
it, and since that’s my main task this afternoon, let me turn to it.
I
Like all markets, a water market provides good price signals only if the market works 
efficiently. Water markets, however, do not and cannot work efficiently. Indeed, so 
pronounced and so fundamental are the inefficiencies that a water market can do little to 
bring about sensible resource allocations. Many of the inefficiencies have to do with 
imperfect information and transaction costs and inadequate numbers of willing buyers and 
sellers. But the chief culprit is that of externalities. In market theory, externalities are 
viewed as minor problems, best dealt with by internalizing them, assuming they’re sizeable 
enough to worry about in the first place. But this just isn’t so in the case of water, which is
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an integral part of a complex natural community. External costs and benefits are hugely 
important, and the vary greatly from place to place and time to time. Indeed, the external 
impacts of a water use can be greater than the internal ones.
Beyond just the sheer quantitative importance of externalities, the market’s way of 
internalizing impacts is by paying money to the person harmed. In the case of water, 
however, many external harms are ecosystem ones, or harms to future generations, or harms 
that are difficult to calculate and trace, or harms that are uncertain. Paying money simply 
cannot redress them.
This issue of externalities is no small problem for market theory. When externalities 
loom large, market allocation methods are severely flawed, so much so that their very 
legitimacy is in doubt.
A related assumption in the water-rights logic is that, like other commodities, water is 
readily transferable, sufficiently so to give rise to a functioning market. A market only 
works if enough buyers and sellers are present. In the case of water, however, there are 
problems on this front. The assumption that water is easily transferred, from place to place 
and use to use, is an idea firmly grounded in a pre-ecological era, in an intangible realm of 
economic theory that is detached from any real place. When we put down our economic 
textbooks and wander out into the natural world, with its richness and complexity, what we 
find is that every detail of a given water use has peculiar ecological impacts-where the water 
is withdrawn, when it’s withdrawn, where it’s used, how it’s used, whether and how long its 
stored, and in what way and by how much it is polluted. In the abstract, a water flow is a 
water flow; it’s the fungible widget of microeconomic theory. In real life, the matter is
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much more messy.
If I may stretch an analogy, trading water is like trading employees. Like water, 
labor is a business input. Businesses can and do transfer employees from place to place.
But water and labor are special kinds of inputs; they’re special in ways that distinguish them 
from, say, steel rods or hamburger buns or software programs. Employees come embedded 
in local communities; they have spouses that work, they have children in school, they have 
homes that they own, they have friends and attachments and local people who depend on 
them. A company can undertake to move its labor input from one place to another, but it 
needs to recognize that only part of that input is going to transfer. Even then, transfer costs 
will be high.
Like labor water can indeed be transferred, but it isn’t an easy or efficient process, 
and it doesn’t ever work very well.
A third assumption of market theory is that, if we simply get private property into 
private hands, and give the owners clear, secure, long-term rights, and allow them to transfer 
their rights freely and at low cost, then the property will be safe and secure. The owner 
will take care of it, and keep it useful and healthy in the long run. Put simply, people take 
care of what they own.
There’s a fair amount of truth to this line of argument—people do typically take better 
care of long-term rights than short-term ones; they often take better care of secure, 
transferable rights than they do rights that are temporary and precarious; and of course 
commonly owned resources and government resources are often badly used. But in the end 
it takes only a little empirical data-gathering to realize that even holders of secure, perpetual
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rights do not always take good care of them. Timber companies sometimes clearcut their 
forests and simply walk away. Farmers often plow hillsides, knowing full well the erosion 
that ensues. Irrigation practices ruin soil; groundwater pumping drains aquifers.
The point is, private owners don’t always take care of what they own. When the 
destruction or consumption has few or no public ramifications, this shortcoming doesn’t 
present a public problem. But in the case of water, bad water use does affect the public, just 
like bad land use does. As we seek to promote ecological integrity, to restore and maintain 
sound waterways, we have to concern ourselves with how water is used. Buying back water 
flows is one way of promoting this goal, sometimes a good one. But with a resource as 
public and vital as clean water, we simply can’t give private owners free rein over what they 
own; we can’t assume, particularly when faced with such contrary evidence, that private 
owners will maintain a sure focus on the long term and the sustainable.
II
Let me turn for a moment from market theory to the essential role of law in 
expressing public values and promoting public understanding. We’re here today because we 
believe that the West faces a water problem. But that isn’t quite so. The problem isn’t with 
water, it’s with people, and with the way those people-the way we-use water and seek to 
use more water. What we have is a people problem. How people use water has a lot to do 
with the way they think about it and value it, which relates to their understandings and to the 
shared values of our culture. One of the public functions of the law, perhaps it’s most vital 
function, is to express cultural values and to help us remind ourselves, and reeducate
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ourselves, about how we can and should act. ■
j
When we consider water rights thinking as a form of public moral education, what 
messages does it convey?
The dominant message of water rights is that water is a commodity, an object that 
exists for humans to move and manipulate, a thing that exists primarily to serve human 
needs. As a commodity, water is like other commodities, like bricks or teacups or paper 
bags or pianos. It’s something we can use and consume and throw away, all as we like.
This message isn’t entirely false, but it isn’t true by more than half. Water-as-commodity 
misses the ecological values, the spiritual values, the aesthetic values. It erroneously and 
dangerously suggests that water is valuable primarily as a tool for one person—the owner—to 
use to gain advantage over other persons. Water is far more than a commodity, it is far 
different as well, and our water-law regime needs to recognize that something else. It needs
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to embody and transmit more varied cultural messages, more sensitive and ethical messages 
about the multiple values of water and, in particular, about the kind of cautious, respectful 
attitude that a person needs to possess whenever he tinkers with natural hydrologic cycles.
Talk of water rights and vested entitlements coneys a related influential message. In 
the ideology of the free market, a human community is nothing more or less than a collection 
of individuals, a gathering of individual people whose purchasing preferences are aggregated 
by invisible market forces. The human community is the sum of its parts, and is fully 
understood by summing its parts. Free-market thinking appeals to Americans because it 
comports so well with our liberal heritage, because of its clear focus on the individual, 
because it exalts individual freedom rather than countervailing ideas of commitment and interconnectio
6
Water rights thinking taps into this atomistic social view, a view that transfers all too 
perniciously from the social realm to the natural one. If the social order is simply a 
collection of individuals, what then is the natural world but a collection of discrete parts? 
What then is the great outdoors but a grand storeroom of "resources" waiting for some 
human to come along and pull them off the shelf? Markets work best when people act 
independently, when products and services come in discrete pieces that the market can move 
and shift to meet customer demands. When market thinking turns toward the natural world, 
it inevitably retains this inherent focus on individual parts. Customers don’t want to buy 
ecosystems, they want to buy its pieces and elements-its trees, its animals, its water, its 
soils; they want to "part it out," as they say in the auto trade. The pitfall here is that we 
undervalue the connections, assuming we even perceive them. In nature, the whole is far 
more than its parts. As we move up the scale of complexity, for cell to organism to 
community to ecosystem, emergent properties arise that were not present in, and often were 
not even predictable in, lower levels of organization. In its main thrust, market thinking 
stands in fundamental opposition to the ecological truths of connection and interdependence.
Perhaps the central fault with market thinking is its grounding in an intellectual 
limitation that permeates western culture and has done so for centuries. Our ingrained 
tendency is to separate ourselves from the rest of the natural world, to assume that humans 
are subjects and that nature is mere object. French philosopher Rene Descartes is often 
blamed for this dualism, but he hardly originated it, nor was he the only major thinker of his 
generation to make this dualism a central element of his world view. Since the age of 
Darwin we’ve been slowly narrowing this radical separation of humans and all else. We still
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have far to go. Environmental problems are widespread because and to the extent that 
human ways and nature’s ways are out of alignment. We can’t restore that alignment 
without embracing our dependence on the natural order. And to do that, we have to develop 
more mature ways of explaining our place in the natural world. Nature is here for us to use 
to meet our needs. But we are part of that nature, as dependent on it in the long run as any 
wolf or jellyfish or newt. Our laws, particularly those dealing with the land, need to reflect 
and proclaim this dependence.
Ill
The water rights system that we’re considering today is part of a larger private 
property regime that was created over many centuries and that’s been passed down within 
our culture. Private ownership is a form of state-sanctioned private power; by owning 
something, we gain rights that offer power over other people. The main justification for this 
system, almost the only defensible justification, is that it is useful, it provides benefits that 
exceed its costs. Utilitarian thinking supplies a potent justification for many forms of private 
ownership, but it’s a shaky and insecure justification in that calculations of utility depend on 
values and circumstances, which vary greatly over time. Because communities vary and 
circumstances vary, private property regimes have come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes 
over the course of human history, each arising to meet the needs of a particular people.
For a property regime to fulfill its functions and to retain its justification it needs to 
be kept up to date, to bend and take on new shapes as communal values and circumstances 
evolve. Sometimes that happens smoothly, as it largely did in the United States in the
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nineteenth century when cultural values shifted to place greater emphasis on expansion and 
economic development at the expense of sensitive land uses and settled agrarian culture. 
Sometimes, though, change doesn’t come smoothly. Sometimes property regimes get out of 
date, a prospect that becomes both more likely and more ominous when holders of private 
rights are powerful enough to resist change. When change is halted, a property regime 
begins to lose its legitimacy. Step by step, people come to view it as unfair, as an 
illegitimate exercise of state-sanctioned power, as an enemy that divides and destroys the 
community rather than as a tool that supports and sustains it. Sometimes it’s the allocation 
of property within the society that causes the problems. More commonly it’s the way 
ownership rights are defined, it is the elements or attributes of what private ownership 
entails. Private property yields its legitimacy when it vests owners with the power to impose 
harm without consequence, when it allows them to dominate others unfairly, when it allows 
them to abuse and undermine things that the community has come to value.
Back in the 1960s Congress passed laws banning racial discrimination in public 
accommodations, in restaurants and motels. Affected property owners claimed that their 
property rights were being altered, and they were right. Before the new laws, landowners 
had the right to discriminate; after the laws they no longer had that power. They lost the 
power to discriminate for just this reason-because in the evolving culture of the day, the 
power to discriminate represented an unfair form of power, a cruel and hurtful form of 
domination.
Consider a second scene, this one from the hills of eastern Kentucky, a landscape of 
badly polluted rivers and degraded communities. During the first half of the century, holders
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of mineral interests in Kentucky had the right to destroy the surface of the land, and every 
structure on it, in their race to stripmine the coal. They caused grave damage, and paid 
nothing in the way of compensation. By the 1960s that form of private ownership had lost 
public favor, and the push for change gained strength. By the 1980s, disfavor had become 
so strong and so angry that, for many Kentuckians, the very legitimacy of the government 
was in question. For far too long the government had bent to the wishes of the coal mining 
industry. Change came slowly in Kentucky, but come it did. Today mining companies still 
can destroy the land surface without bothering to seek permission. But at least they have to 
pay for what they destroy. Sooner or later, one day, they will need to get consent.
Since prior appropriation was bom in the 1850s, it has undergone a continuing 
evolution in the elements that define private rights. Yet even with this evolution, people are 
increasingly offended by it. As critics see it, water law gives owners too much power to 
dominate and harm. What is noteworthy about this otherwise unexceptional evolution is that 
the underlying harm is not harm to other people, at least not directly; it’s harm to the land 
itself. Restaurants that discriminated by race caused human harm. Strip miners did destroy 
land, but the harm that moved Kentucky citizens was less the environmental degradation than 
it was the human drama, the farm houses slipping down hillsides, the towns being literally 
uprooted, the poor people ejected as so much trash.
Cultural values change, circumstances change, definitions of harm change, aesthetic 
appraisals change. If water law is going to retain its legitimacy, it too needs to change, far 
more than it has already done.
The water rights advocate, of course, has a ready response to all of this. Aren’t we
10
just talking about the need to shift water uses? Can’t the market accommodate this 
fluctuation in preferences? Can’t tax dollars be used to purchase the water flows now needed 
to promote ecosystem health and other new public values?
The answer is: yes, the market can help alleviate this problem; yes, tax money can 
end the most affronting and damaging water uses. But moving money around doesn’t 
address the core problem. Market transfers shift rights among owners, they bring about 
resource reallocations, but they don’t alter the nature of those rights. In the case of water 
law, as with the 1960s restaurants and the Kentucky stripminers, the complaint is not about 
the distribution of property rights. It’s about the meaning of ownership itself, about the 
power that private ownership entails. For the law to remain legitimate it needs to ban 
harmful activities, which is to say activities that the community has come to view as wrong 
and illegitimate. It’s not enough for the law to furnish mechanisms to pay property owners 
to stop the harm. We could have paid motel owners to stop discriminating, and maybe there 
was a moment in time when payment seemed sensible. By the 1960s, that solution was no 
longer just. And it was not, I emphasize, it was not a matter of simply saving tax money. 
Race discrimination had come to be wrong. It was no longer legitimate for state-sanctioned 
power to stand ready to aid landowners who chose to discriminate.
If I ’m right, if our current water rights regime faces a crisis of legitimacy, what is the 
nature of the problem?
If I read it correctly, the complaint being raised today does not call into question the 
idea of private rights in water-no more than past complaints challenged private restaurants or 
private coal mines. Americans aren’t socialists, particularly Americans who live in arid
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places. Moreover, the complaint against water law also has little to do with priorities based 
on time. First-in-time is not the fairest method of allocating scare resources, but it isn’t the
most unfair either. By all appearances, our culture remains content to let many races go to 
the swiftest.
Water law faces a crisis of legitimacy because of the elements of owning water, 
because Western water law allows owners to use water in ways that now seem wrong. Some 
permitted uses, in fact, now seem so wrong that it would be an affront to communal values, 
as well as a distasteful reaffirmation of a flawed property regime, to expect taxpayers to pay 
owners to change their hurtful ways. To expect the market to remedy this situation is to 
misunderstand the law’s unavoidable role in expressing communal values, particularly our 
shared, evolving senses of justice and fairness.
IV
How then should the law of water rights change in order to regain its legitimacy, to 
respond to the mounting claim that it empowers private owners to use their property in ways 
that unjustly harm and oppress?
One obvious target for change is the diversion requirement. By requiring diversion 
from a streambed, water law discredits water uses that promote instream flow values. To the 
ecologically aware, the law’s stupidity could hardly shine more clearly. Aside from the 
harm they do, stupid laws lack the requisite level of legitimacy. The time has come for 
change.
A second target for reform is the longstanding, much-modified rule that water is
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available for appropriation so long as a single drop remains in the stream or aquifer. Total 
consumption, draining a river dry, is the apotheosis of shortsighted, anthropocentric hubris.
A more sensible rule must be found.
These two matters, and several others like them, would improve prior appropriation 
law. But if we’re going to cut to the root of the problem we need to put teeth into the 
requirement of beneficial use. The main defining limit of water rights needs to be the 
beneficial use rule, or something like it. And beneficial use must mean beneficial by the 
standards of today’s culture, not some culture long-eclipsed by changing values and 
circumstances. As too-often applied, beneficial use is far out of date, not the least because it 
ignores water quality. As currently defined, beneficial use is an affront to citizens, who 
know stupidity when they see it. It is also, I would add, an unnecessary embarrassment to 
defenders of private water rights, who have the unenviable task of claiming, for instance, 
that some benefit arises when a river is fully drained so that its waters might flow lushly 
through unlined open ditches onto desert soil to grow low-value, surplus agricultural crops 
and cause severe water pollution. People know better than this, and if the law doesn’t soon 
learn better, more trouble lies ahead.
To foster these changes we have two options, both unfortunately with limitations.
Back in the last century the chief method used to update property law was by way of 
common-law decisionmaking. Property law was a creation of state courts, and judges did 
their best to keep it current. During the past century, the main lawmaking work in the 
property realm has shifted to legislative and regulatory chambers. Ownership norms are now 
set forth in land-use regulations and environmental laws, with the common law left behind.
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For several good reasons, change in water law is better made by legislature and 
regulatory agencies. Change made in this manner can build on detailed hearings and 
multiple views, with experts called to help. Legal lines can be drawn sharply in a way that 
common law courts find awkward if not impossible. As usefully, change can occur 
prospectively; it can be phased in, with advance warning to parties affected.
But legislative and regulatory change also has drawbacks, largely political ones. Try 
as they might agencies have trouble identifying and fostering a public interest. Too often and 
too visibly they are bent by vested interests. Legislatures, unfortunately, are just as prone to 
lend support for public choice theories of small-group domination. If the experience of 
public-lands politics is any model, prospects for useful reform are guarded at best.
Common-law change usually escapes this undue influence, but it too faces limits. 
Courts cannot hold exhaustive hearings. Judges are rarely experts in water law, must less 
water policy. Courts favor vague standards, not sharp lines. Perhaps most troubling is that 
common law adjudication usually works retroactively, with newly announced rules applied, 
not just to future arising disputes, but to the very case under consideration. When a court 
decides that a water use is unreasonable or non-beneficial, it doesn’t admonish the water user 
to halt the practice soon: It declares the water right at an end.
On balance, legislative and regulatory changes offer the better option. So long as we 
have an interested public—as we seem to have on water issues—lawmaking entities can pursue 
the public interest. Still, there is another lingering concern that needs comment. One of the 
reasons why the water-rights debate is so contentious is because our ideas of property 
ownership are so tied with one particular part of our legal culture. Until the mid-nineteenth
14
century, land-use regulations were viewed as amplifications and modifications of the 
ownership norms set forth in the common law. But right around mid-century, a break 
occurred. Land-use statutes and regulations came to form a separate realm of law, a public 
realm, distinct from private ownership norms. In time, as environmental laws arrived, they 
too were placed in the public law category; they didn’t serve to refine and update ownership 
norms, they cut into them to foster public aims. This split was particularly apparent in the 
case of environmental statutes, which were promulgated at the federal level, visibly distinct 
from ownership norms arising under state law.
In reality, land-use ordinances and environmental regulations are very much part and 
parcel of what private ownership is all about today, including the ownership of water. Only 
the legal mind holds on to this artificial separation; only the legal mind remains dominated 
by the law’s old dichotomies—private v. public, common law v. statute, state v. federal.
Until we can rise above these dichotomies, or more aptly put them behind us, positive law 
changes to water law will not fully succeed. To remedy our current predicament, new 
definitions of beneficial use and other needed changes must be understood for what they a re - 
updating changes in the ownership rights of private rights holders. They are redefinitions of 
those private rights, modernizations of those rights, not interferences with them. If 
defenders of the old order are going to keep going back to the nineteenth century, if they’re 
going to keep insisting that the common law is the one and true source of private ownership 
norms, statutory and regulatory change can only partially succeed.
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VThis leaves us, finally, with the question that’s been looming ominously in the 
background, awaiting its turn to cause mischief. If lawmakers do wield the power to 
redefine private water rights, is their any limit to how far they can go? Can they redefine 
private rights into oblivion? Is there, in practice, a useable distinction between redefinition 
and confiscation?
This issue, I sense, is the crux of the matter today. Because no firm answer yet 
exists to it, and indeed because few if any possible answers are even apparent, defenders of 
private rights have taken a firm line, the firmest being that any alteration of water rights, 
however modest, amounts to a taking, triggering the payment of just compensation.
For reasons more pragmatic than constitutional, private rights do deserve protection. 
And critics who seek to change water rights, particularly those who seek major change, must 
face up to the task of explaining that protection. If the Constitution doesn’t protect every 
last detail of nineteenth-century water rights jurisprudence, what does it protect? If a state 
legislature or supreme court can’t go all the way in redefining rights, how far can it go? As 
one reads the leading water-reform manifestos of the past few years—documents like the 
Long’s Peak Working Group Report and the important recent volume, Searching for the 
Headwaters—it’s hard to find much attention paid to this matter. Here and there are soothing 
words about viable private water rights, but soothing words are no replacement for clear 
constitutional protection. In fairness to holders of water rights, this project needs attention.
One of the key protections for water rights needs to be a requirement that new 
regulations and redefinitions apply broadly, to all water users similarly situated. With all the
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current talk about full participation and public hearings and watershed planning and 
integrated assessments and the like, it’s easy for a water user to fear that decisionmaking in 
the era of ecology will be subjective and ad hoc. Some institutional water czar will simply 
reach out to seize particular water flows that are needed to serve the public interest. And 
who’s to say otherwise? Once a watershed master plan is finally developed, what then is 
supposed to happen? Does the governing agency simply ban all water uses that are less then 
ideal? More generally, how does watershed planning fit together with private water rights?
My suggestion is that a state should have substantial power to ban particular bad 
water uses, but only if the state makes a settled, uniformly applied determination that a 
particular practice is harmful, either because it is a wasteful water use wherever conducted or 
because it has side effects that are plainly harmful. A state should have no power to 
command one water user to halt while allowing a similarly situated water user to continue.
A water use cannot fairly be halted simply because planners find a higher or better use. 
Without such a requirement of generalizability, water users would live in constant fear.
As vital as the beneficial-use idea is and needs to be, I wonder whether the term itself 
is adding to our current confusion. Americans don’t like to be told what to do, particularly 
when it’s the government telling us to be good. We’re far more comfortable when told not 
to cause harm. At the core of property law is the old sic utere doctrine, which requires 
private owners to cause no harm to others. Private nuisance law builds on that doctrine 
today, banning unreasonable land uses that cause substantial harm. In contrast to nuisance 
law and sic utere. beneficial use conjures up images of ideal or socially optimum water uses, 
as determined, presumably, by agencies and bureaucrats. It s no wonder that beneficial use
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makes water users nervous. To reap the communal benefits of durable private rights in 
water, we can’t insist that private owners engage in the most socially beneficial water uses as 
identified from time to time by a never-ending planning process. What we can expect, and 
should by law demand, is that water users avoid actions that are harmful, under widely 
applicable statutes and regulations, preferably ones issued with substantial advance notice.
Once harmful water uses are halted, then we can step back and decide how much 
additional water is needed to foster ecological integrity and promote the other instream-flow 
values that have rightfully become so important. At that stage, however, money ought to 
change hands; private owners deserve payment for what they lose.
The power that I would give govemment-the power to ban harmful water uses—is far 
different from the power to confiscate private water rights. As harmful water uses are 
identified—whether phrased in terms of harm, or reasonable water use, or beneficial water 
use-new standards should apply prospectively. A water user engaged in a newly banned use 
should have three options: shift to a new beneficial use, sell the water, or do nothing and 
lose it. So long as all three options are open, so long as new rules apply fairly and widely to 
similarly situated water users, fairness concerns should not loom large. As more water users 
choose to sell rather than switch, water markets should expand, allowing private groups and 
governments more easily and cheaply to purchase water for instream-flow purposes.
VI
In many of its essentials, Prior Appropriation is not dead. More aptly, I think, his 
political party has lost a number of recent elections, and in a few western states has slipped
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into minority party status. But if voters are getting a bit tired of old Prior, it’s important that 
reformers avoid the all too common political mistake of interpreting a vote against their 
opponent as a vote in their favor.
Voters are turning against Prior because they dislike private property regimes that 
give owners the power to engage in wasteful water uses and to cause grave environmental 
harm. But voting against Prior is not the same as voting in favor of Mr. Endless Process 
Bureaucrat. Americans like private property, and with good reason. As a cultural 
institution, it’s done well by us, and with updating and pruning it can continue to provide 
useful service. American voters are fickle creatures. Cleaned up and given a new suit of 
clothes, who knows, old Prior just might come charging back.
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